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ONE of the principal uses of national income statistics is to determine
whether and to what extent people are becoming better off over time.
For instance, the central piece of evidence cited by Pearson in Partners
in Development1 tosupport his case that poor countries need more aid
than they are getting is a table showing growth rates of real GNP per
head of rich and poor countries to be 3.6 and 2.5 per cent, respectively,
over the years 1960—67. The argument is that the disparity in growth
rates, ifit continues, will in time prove detrimental to rich and poor
countries alike, and that aid is a means of reducing the disparity.
I am not concerned in this paper with Pearson's argument per so but
with the role of statistics in that argument. To serve as evidence in the
kind of case Pearson is making, income statistics must reflect well-being,
and it must be at least approximately true that people are better off in
countries where incomes are high than in countries where incomes are
low. From this it follows that the scope of income should be comprehen-
sive, for if a substantial component of well-beingis excluded from
income and if that component of well-being grows at different rates in
different countries, then it may happen that income as conventionally
measured grows faster in country A than in country B despite the fact
that people in country B are becoming relatively better off.
The aspect of well-being thatisto be examined inthis paper is
longevity. If you ask a man whether he prefers economic conditions as
they are today to those of fifty or a hundred years ago, he would prob-
NOTE: I am grateful to Ruth Simonton of Statistics Canada and to Philip
Smith, a graduate student at Queen's University, for developing the computer
program. Philip Smith also assisted me ablyin searching for and processing
data. This study has been financed in part by the Canada Council and in part
by Statistics Canada.
1L.B. Pearson, Partners in Development, Pall Mall Press, 1969, p. 55.194 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
ably answer that he prefers conditions as they are today, and his prefer-
ence might well have less to do with the material things we possess than
with the fact that we live longer. He may add that he might not have
survived to his present age had his date of birth been pushed back fifty
or a hundred years to a time when mortality rates in infancy and child-
hood were very much higher than they are now. In Canada, from 1926
to 1968, the infant mortality rate fell from about 1 in 10 to about 1 in 50
and the mortality rate of children aged 1 to 4 fell from I in 100 to I in
1,000. It is possible that no increase in goods and services would induce
us to accept a return of mortality rates as they were as recently as 1926.
One can understand why the increase in life expectancy is not nor-
mally included as an element in the measure of economic growth. Life
expectancy, or the mortality rates from which it is composed, is a peculiar
commodity. Mortality rates are partly private goods and partly public
goods, partly purchased and partly free, and some expenditures tending
to increase life expectancy are already included in the accounts so that
an imputation for increased life expectancy would result in double count-
ing if the rest of the national accounts were left unchanged. The imputa-
tion would constitute a major departure from the convention that only
marketable or potentially marketable items be included in the national
accounts. That convention is appropriate for statistics designed as an aid
in determining fiscal or monetary policy, and the decision to impute for
increased life expectancy would involve us in having to keep two time
series of income statistics, one for stabilization policy and another as a
social indicator.
The first step in the development of an imputation for increased life
expectancy is to make life expectancy commensurate with the rest of the
data in the national accounts. Like any value, the value of increased life
expectancy must be amenable to representation as the product of a
quantity and a price. Quantities present no difficulty because age-specific
mortality rates may be looked upon as though they were quantities, and
we have adequate historical data on age-specific mortality rates for many
countries.
The difficulty is in determining price. The price data do not come
ready-made from the national statistical offices as do the data on mortality
rates, but we may draw on a fairly extensive and growing body of
economic literature on the value of life; for the price that is required
to construct an imputation in the accounts is the same price that is appro-
priate in cost-benefit analysis of medical expenditure, road safety, and
the like.Measure of Changes in Life Expectancy 195
Atthe outset of this discussion, it is important to distinguish between
three questions which are perhaps related but which are nonetheless
distinct. The first of these, which might be called the insurance question,
is "What is my life worth to my wife and children?"; and the expected
answer is "A sum of money that would enable my wife and children to
be as well off financially in the event of my death as they would be if I
remained alive." The second, which might be called the birth control
question, is "How much better or worse off would the community at
large be if I ceased to exist or if I had never been born?" The answer
to this question might well be that the rest of you would be better off
financially without me. The third question, which is the true "valuation-
of-life question," is "How much would I pay to avoid a small probability
of my death?" If I were prepared to pay $500 to avoid a 1in 1,000
probability of death through disease or accident, then it might be said
that my valuation of my life is $500,000. The valuation of life in the
community is some average of the valuations of individuals. Whatever
the answer to the valuation-of-life question, that answer is distinct from
the answers to the insurance question and the birth control question.
Dublin and Lotka,2 though by no means the first to examine these
issues, are generally taken as the starting point for modern work. It is
significant that they were employees of an insurance company. Their
problem was to determine the amount of insurance a man ought to
carry. They computed the difference between the present value of a
man's earnings and the present value of his consumption and called that
difference the value of his life. Given their purpose, their procedure was
correct to the best of my knowledge.
Recently, Dublin and Lotka's methods have been used for an alto-
gether different purpose. Weisbrod, Klarman, Fein, Rice, and others
have dealt with the problem of determining the cost of disease. The cost
of a disease is the sum of direct cost, including medical expenditures
and loss of a man's earnings while he is alive, and indirect cost, which
these authors take to be the present value of the forgone earnings of the
men who die of the disease.4 The general principle in these computations
2Louis1.. Dublin and Alfred J. Lotka, The Money Value of a Man, Ronald
Press, 1946.
The recent history of attempts to evaluate the costs of disease is presented
in J. A. Dowie, "Valuing the Benefits of Health Improvement," Australian Eco-
ncnnic Papers, June 1970, pp. 21—41. A useful bibliography isincluded.
There is an interesting discussion in Dowie's article of whether the present
value of a man's consumption should be deducted from the present value of his
income in computing the value of his life,a problem which is symptomatic of
the confusion over the interpretation of the phrase "value of life."196 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
is that declines in mortality rates can be evaluated according to the for-
gone earnings of the dead. The principle, if correct, would provide us
with a simple way of evaluating the historical decline in mortality rates.
In my opinion the principle is incorrect, because it supplies the right
answer to the wrong question. It answers the insurance question in place
of the value-of-life question. The present value of the forgone earnings
of the dead is the right amount of insurance for a man to carry, but it
is not indicative of the amount of money he would pay to avoid a small
risk of losing his life, and itis not indicative of the amount of money
rational men would be prepared to pay to eradicate a disease.5
A man who has insured his life for the full value that Dublin and
Lotka have put upon it is not indifferent to whether he lives or dies, and
the value he puts on his lifein forestalling risks of losing it may be
greater or less than the amount of his insurance.
The use of discounted future income as a measure of the value of
one's life is sometimes justified on the grounds that one's earnings are
a measure of one's value to the rest of the community. This is a con-
fusion between the valuation of life question and the birth control ques-
tion. A consensus has emerged in the literature on the cost-benefit
analysis of birth control that the benefits derived from preventing a
birth are very great and that the eventual per capita income of the
community is a decreasing function of the birth rate. The reason is
the Malthusian one that the smaller the population, the greater the
capital-labor ratio. This argument applies withless forcetoadults
than to unborn children, but it applies nonetheless. Imagine a family
complete with children and all heirs destroyed in an automobile accident.
Notwithstanding the loss of forgone earnings, this event makes the rest
of us better off because we acquire title to all the family's assets including
their rights to use schools and other public property. By definition, if
the family is typical, any excess of its earnings over its consumption
would accrue to its heirs and not to the rest of us. There is some dis-
location in the economy if a departure is less orderly, but there is no
reason to suppose that the Costs to the survivors of having people go
separately rather than in families outweighs the effect of a man's death
My views on this issue are very close to those of Thomas Schelling. "The
Life You Save May Be Your Own." inS. Chase, ed., ProblemsinPublic Es-
pcrzdiuire Analysis, Brookings, 1968, PP.127—161. A more complete exposition
of this approach tolife savingiscontained inE.J.Mishan, "Evaluation of
Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach." Journal of Political Econo,nv, July—
August 1971. pp. 687—705. Mishan evaluates the saving of lives by means of the
concept of consumer surplus and, formally atleast,incorporates externalities
into the analysis. but he makes no attempt to specify functional forms of his
curves or to produce numerical estimates.Measure of Changes in Life Expectancy 197
onthe capital-labor ratio. Certainly we are concerned as a community
to keep each other alive but that concern is based on something other
than the maximization of GNP, in total or per head.
To equate the value of life to discounted earnings forgone is to sup-
pose that the lives of housewives and old people are worthless. In
one sense this is quite true. Dublin and Lotka's calculations would
imply that old people and wives ought not to carry insurance, and this
may well be the case. It is not the case that old people and wives place
no value on prolonging their lives or that society as a whole is uncon-
cerned with the matter.
The present value of earnings is not a measure of the value of a
man's life, in the sense of reflecting the amount of money a man would
spend to reduce age-specific mortality rates. To find a value of life for
converting reductions in age-specific mortality rates into an imputation
in the national accounts, we need to consider carefully what it is that
is maximized in expenditures to reduce age-specific mortality rates and
to seek evidence on what people actually pay for this purpose. We begin
with an examination of utility maximization in circumstances where the
length of life is variable. Then we attempt to generalize the concept of
income to incorporate changes in mortality rates as benefits. Finally,
on the strength of some very crude assumptions, we construct an impu-
tation for the increase in life expectancy, and compare growth rates of
income with that imputation and without it.
MAXIMIZATION OF UTILITY WITH A LENGTH-OF-LIFE VARIABLE
Ignore the fact that men live in families and that families are imbedded
in communities of people who are concerned with each other's well-being.
Suppose instead that each man seeks to maximize his own welfare repre-
sented by the function
U =U(U0, U1, P1, ..., Pa), (I)
where U is his welfare in the present circumstances, P2 is the probability
of his living for exactly i years, U2 is his welfare if he lives for exactly i
years, and n is the postulated upper limit to the length of his life. The
probabilities must sum to I.
1. (2)
Values of the terms UE,and n depend on a man's age. If the maxi-
mum length of life is assumed to be 90 years, the n relevant to a 50-year-
old man is 40. The value of P10 for a 50-year-old man depends on mortalityn
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rates between age 50 and age 60; the value of Pio for a 60-year-old man
depends on mortality rates between age 60 and age 70, and so on.In
deriving an imputation for the national accounts, values of U will have
to be averaged over the age distribution of the population.
The utility function, corresponding to a life of t years depends on
consumption in each of those years
Ut =Ut(Co, Ci, C2, ...,Ce_i), (3)
where C0 is consumption in the current year, and G is consumption in
the year i.
The functions (1), (2), and (3) form a discrete representation of what
is in reality a continuous process.It is convenient to think of consump-
tionas evenly spread out over the year i, and of death occurring if at
all on the first day of the year.It is as though the whole risk of dying
in a year were concentrated on one's birthday. A man alive in the year
0 is presumed safe until the first day of the year 1, and if he survives that
day he is safe again until the first day of the year 2, and so on.
It is useful to define two additional mortality variables:is the mor-
tality rate t years hence, and St is the probability of surviving up to the






Obviously, 0 << 1, 0 <Pt < 1, and 0 <St < 1, and=1if n is
the maximum length of life.6
6Equations(2) and (5) are consistent as long as=1.From equation (4) it follows
that S, =S,_,—D,_1S,_1 for all values of r.
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These properties jointly imply that a man thinks himself better off if
consumption in any year is increased or if his probability of dying in any
given year is reduced. For simplicity we are also assuming that the con-
sumption Cg takes on the same value in every utility function U, in which
it appears.
The assumptions represented by the inequalities (6), (7), and (8) are
reasonable and for the most part innocuous, but they are not strong
enough to connect the theory to the available data so as to permit us to
incorporate an imputation for increased life expectancy into the statistics
of economic growth. As a first step toward constructing this imputation,
let it be assumed that the utility function of equation (1) takes the special
form
(1')
This specification which we shall refer to as "the expected utility assump-
tion" fits exactly into the terms of reference of the "states of the world"
approach to the theory of choice under uncertainty. All possible lengths
of life t correspond to mutually exclusive states of the world and the
are probabilities of their occurrence.7It is a well-known property of
utility functions of this sort that they are cardinal rather than ordinal
and may be defined up to a linear transformation;8 given values of any
two utility functions U. andfor the years i and j and for any given
time paths of consumption, all values of all utility functionsfor all
years : and all time paths of consumption could be determined by a con-
ceptual experiment of the sort used to determine the shape of an ordinary
indifference curve.
See J. Hirshleifer, "Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty," QuarterlyJournal
of Economics, November1965 and May 1966.
8Fora justification of this assertion see Robert D. Luce and H. Raitfa, Gamesand
Decisions, Wiley,1957, Chap. 2.
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The price a man would pay for a reduction in any age-specific mortality
rate may be derived from his utility function. Taking current consumption
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which is independent of the two arbitrary values used to establish a scale
for the utility function U, because these values cancel out between the
numerator and the denominator of equation (9).
In principle, the value of a reduction in any age-specific mortality rate
could be determined from equation (9) if the right conceptual experiment
were performed to determine the shape of U. No attempt at such an
experiment is made in this paper.'° Instead we postulate the general
shape of the function Ug and endow the function with a parameter the













The final step in this derivation follows from the fact that
—E =S,—S, D11(1 —Dj1=0.
,—,+, 1 —D, L11+1 i—i+1 J
The proof in note 6 can be extended to show that the expression in square brackets is
equal to I.
10 At least one attempt has been made to derive by questionnaire a utility function
encompassing income, risks of death, and various states of ill health. See 0. Torrance,
AGeneralized Cost-Effectiveness Model for the Evaluation of Health Programs, Faculty
of Business, McMaster University, Research Series No. 101, 1970.Measure of Changes in Life Expectanây 201
subjectivefeelings about, the value of life. Assume that the contributions
of each C2 to the functionare separable and that all utility functions




whererisa rate of discount connecting "annual utility" accruing at
different periods of time andis the elasticity of annual utility with respect
to consumption.
Given this assumption, the price of a reduction in the mortality rate
at time t becomes"
I C.\8
—8C0 1
(10) aD1 fi 1...' (1 + r)'(1—Do)(l—D,)
If we make the additional assumption, an assumption which is reasonable
in the context of national accounting, that C2 =C,=Cfor all i and j,




aD0 i..o (1 + r)'(1—D0)2
11Equation(10) is derived by substituting equation (3') into equation (9).The
numerator of equation (9) becomes
(1 —D,)
— U,)=













(1 +r)1J(1 —D0)(1 —D,)n
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The term 1/(1 —Do)2enters equation (11) as a consequence of our
assumption that consumption and risk of death enter the utility function
as discrete units instead of as flows over time. The term could be elimi-
nated from equation (11) by shortening the time periods enough that the
probability of dying in any period is effectively zero. Instead of graduating
time in years, we might graduate it in weeks, days, or seconds.
The parameter r in equations (3') and (11) is different from and as a
rule less than the real rate of interest on riskiess assets. A lender of money
faces two types of risk. The first is that the borrower does not repay
the loan. The second is that the lender himself dies before the date of
repayment. Normally, when we speak of a loan as being riskiess we are
referring to the absence of only the first type of risk whereas r is a rate
of discount riskiess in both respects. An individual in a competitive
market arranges his time pattern of work and consumption to equate his
rate of substitution in use between present and future consumption to




whereis the market's real rate of interest on riskiess tyearloans. On
the other hand, it is a consequence of equation (3') that for any j>
aGo 1 ——= . (13)
u.(l+r)t
It is easily shown that
I 1
=—(—) ' (14)
(1 + uS1 (1 + r)t
which implies that r <as long as Co ￿ The term Se/Si in equation
(14) is like a second discount factor, for it is the product of annual com-
ponents, all of which are less than 1.
The separability assumption (3') is a much stronger assumption and a
much less theoretically acceptable one than the expected utility hypothesis
(1').It is a discrete version of an assumption used widely in the theory
of economic growth, and its advantages and disadvantages in that context
are well-known.'2 The advantage of equation (3') in our context is that
it can accommodate any observed market price of life through an appro-
priate choice of r andIf, for instance, a man of age 30 pays $100 to
12SeeH. Wan, EconomicGrowth, HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1971, pp. 267—285.c.
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aGO
avoid a 1 in 1,000chanceof losing his life, his value of ——is$100,000
aD0
and values of the parameters of r andcan be chosen to equate the two
sides of equation (11). The principal disadvantage of equation (3') is
that no value is placed on longevity itself independently of the level of





which would imply, if a> 1, that a man would accept a reduction in the
present value of the timestream of in order to prolong his life. The
consequences of assumptions like (3") will not be investigated.
GROWTH OF WHAT?
Economic growth is usually defined as the rate of appreciation of real
income per head. Though the customary measure of income in this con-
text is gross national product, we recognize that net national product
is the more appropriate concept and would use it as the measure of in-
come but for certain difficulties in measuring depreciation. Our problem
is to expand the concept of real income per head to impute for the fall
in mortality rates.
One's first instinct is to go back to Hicks's definition of income as the
amount that a man may consume in a year without impoverishing him-
self. This is usually interpreted by the formula,
Y(t) = C(t) + W(t + 1) —W(t), (15)
where Y(t) is income in the year t, C(t) is consumption in the year t,
and W(t) is wealth at the outset of the year t.'3 Presumably anticipated
improvement in mortality rates would be incorporated in wealth which
in turn is closely related to utility as defined by equations (1), (2), and
(3) above. If during the course of a year, a man comes to believe that
the mortality rates facing him in the rest of his life will be lower than he
had anticipated at the beginning of the year, then W(t + 1) will be
that much greater than W(t) and income will have increased accordingly.
There are several reasons why this framework is not appropriate for
imputing a value for the fall in mortality rates. First, a national account-
13Weshall use a term of the form X(t) to refer to the value of the variable
I in the year 1. This usage should be distinguished from I,, which refers to an
event that may or may not occur 1 years in the future.204 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
ant measuring growth cannot be expected to predict future mortality
rates, any more than he can be expected to predict future consumption.
The most the national accountant can be expected to observe is current
consumption, current age-specific mortality rates, current investment,
and that part of current wealth that is actually evaluated in the market.
Second, anticipated reductions in age-specific mortality rates appear to
individuals as windfall gains that accrue not in the present year but in
the future. Such windfall gains could play havoc with measures of
growth of income as defined by equation (15), for they could cause in-
come to decline steadily from the base year even though people are be-
coming steadily better off. Suppose C is constant forever and mortality
rates are improving at a decreasing rate, so that W(t + 1) > W(t) for
all t, but [W(2) —W(1)]> [W(3) —W(2)]> [W(4) —W(3)]and
so on. Clearly, Y is declining over time and economic growth is negative.
Whatever it is to which we impute a value for increased life expectancy,
it cannot be income as defined by equation (15).
I suggest that what we are seeking to observe is the growth rate of a
surrogate for U as defined in equation (1). We wish to record the im-
provement in well-being inclusive of current consumption and prospects
for the future. This statement must be qualified in an important respect.
As has already been said, the national accountant cannot presume to
know what people expect for the future. He designs measures to reflect,
not welfare given current expectations for the future, but welfare as it
would be if current conditions persisted indefinitely into the future.
Measures of economic growth should be designed to reflect the growth
of U of equation (1), as it would be if allwere equal to current in-
come per head and allwere equal to age-specific mortality rates in
the current year. Theare measured by current income rather than by
current consumption on the assumption that income is the maximum
consumption that can be sustained indefinitely with present technology
and
Our statistics of economic growth are to reflect the improvement in U,
but they cannot record the growth of U itself because, at best, U is only
defined up to a linear transformation and the growth rate of U is not
defined at all. We must find a variable which is a surrogate for U and for
which a growth rate is well-defined. Fortunately this problem is funda-
mentally the same as that of measuring real consumption in circum-
Thisinterpretation of real income is compared with other interpretations in
Dan Usher, "The Concept of Real Income," Queen's Discussion Papers, No. 99,
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stanceswhere prices are changing over time. In that case, we choose a
base year and define real consumption in any other year to be the amount
of money needed to make one as well off in the base year as one was in
the other year.
By analogy, we define a term C(t) to be the value of net national
product at which one would be as well off with mortality rates of the
base year as one was in the year twithactual net national product, C(t),
and actual mortality rates, ofthat year. If the base year is 1961,
C(t) is defined by the equation
U[C(t), D( 1961)] =U[C(t),D(t)J, (16)
where D(t) is a vector of age-specific mortality rates in the year 1.As
conventionally measured, economic growth is the growth of C(t). When
an imputation is made for increased life expectancy, economic growth
becomes the growth of C(t). The effect of the improvement in mortality
rates on growth is the difference between the growth rate of C(t) and the
growth rate of C(t).
These measures are illustrated in Figure 1. Imagine three men, one
living in 1926, one living in 1961, and one living in 1968. They can
FIGURE 1
.11n
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live for at most two periods, they face probabilities D(t) of dying at the
start of the second period, their consumption, C(t), is the same in both
periods, and their utility functions are identical.
U(t) =U[C(t),D(t)]. (17)
Three indifference curves, one containing the C and D of 1926, another
containing the C and D of 1961, and a third containing the C and D of
1968 are shown in Figure 1. Points representing values of C and D in
the years 1926, 1961, and 1968 are labeled accordingly. Consumption
as conventionally measuredisindicated by thepoints C(1926),
C(1961), and C(1968) on the vertical axis. Consumption inclusive of
a premium for the improvement in mortality rates is indicated by the
points C(1926), E(1961), and where each isdefined
in accordance with equation (16) as the amount of consumption one
would need in 1961 to be as well off as a man living in the year t.
Finallythere is the question of whose utility we are considering in
estimating values of U or its surrogate C. In accordance with accounting
conventions, we would want to measure the average value of C in the
population as a whole, taking young and old into account. Other things
being equal, the C of a young man would be greater than the C of an
old man, and these would have to be averaged according to the propor-
tions of young men and old men in the population. This averaging
procedure would have to be conducted with respect to a standard age
distribution (for instance, the age distribution in the base year), for we
would not want our statistics to imply that people are becoming better
off over time if all that is happening is that the proportion of young
people in the population is increasing.
MEASURING ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH AN IMPUTATION
FOR THE INCREASE IN LIFE EXPECTANCY
The development of the argument so far is that economic growth in-
clusive of an imputation for increased life expectancy is the growth of a
variable where
U[C(t), D(1961)] =U[C(r),D(t)1 (16)
where the utility function in equation (16) is of the form
n 1—IC.$ nC.8S.
(18)r
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andU is measured as if allwere equal to the current net national
product, and allwere current age-specific mortality rates. Designate
the common value of C, by C(t)andthe value in the year tof
i=o(l+r)'
by L(t).Hence, equations (18) and (16) become
• U(t) = (19)
and
= C(t)[L(t)/L(1961)]"8. (20)
The significant feature of equation (20) is that the terms on the right-hand
side of the equation representing conventional income, C(t), and increased
life expectancy, are multiplicative; so the rates of growth
of the two terms cumulate rather than average out in the formation of
the final rate.
=Gc+ (GL/13). (21)
Normally imputations to the accounts are added in rather than multi-
plied in, so that the effect of an imputation is to reduce the rate of growth
whenever the growth of the imputed item is less than the growth of the
rest of the accounts.It follows from the assumptions we have made
about the form of utility function and the concept of income that the
effect of the imputation for increased life expectancy is necessarily to
increase the rate of growth, and that the increase is normally greater than
the rate of growth of life expectancy itself.





Equations(21) and (.22) are the basis for all of the estimates which we
will derive.
A
Timeseries of C(t) can be computed from observed values of income
and mortality rates for given values of the parameters r andRecall
that the parameter r is defined in equation (3') as a rate of discount on
annual utility for a given length of life. It is different from and as a rule
less than the market rate of interest. It seems reasonable to suppose that
this rate lies between zero and 5 per cent.
I208 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
The choice of a value for /3 is more critical and we have less a priori
information to guide us in our judgment. A case can be made for suppos-
ing that=1.This would imply that in all decisions affecting values




Aman would pay a part of the present value of his expected
lifetime consumption. He would be indifferent to whether he lives a
long life or a short life if consumption per year in the short life is suf-
ficiently higher than consumption per year in the long life that the
present values of consumption are the same. It is possible for taste to
have this form but there is no good reason to suppose that it does, and
a man might well be willing to exchange some present value for a longer
life. Nevertheless, the maximization of wealth assumption has the right
qualitative implications: the value of life is an increasing function of
consumption and of the expected length of life, but the marginal valua-
tion of an extra year of life at any given value of consumption is a
decreasing function of life expectancy. One might argue that the growth
over time of the expected present value of lifetime consumption as it
would be if current income and current mortality rates persisted indefi-
nitely is a useful statistic to observe even though it is a poor surrogate
for utility.
The alternative to supposing that /3 =1is to estimate /3 from equation
(22). For this purpose we need an observation on the value of the life
of a man of whom we know his age, his expected consumption, and his
mortality rates in every future year because all of these characteristics
affect the value of —t9C0/9D0. In principle, one could get this informa-
tion from questionnaires. One might ask, "Suppose there is a 1 in 1,000
chance that the cup in front of you contains hemlock rather than coffee.
What would you pay to avoid having to drink the contents of the cup?"
The answer, multiplied by 1,000, would be the value the respondent
places on his life, and, by questioning people of different ages and with
different incomes, one could obtain some notion of how the response is
affected by these variables. Of course, no serious statistician would ever
pose this question because the respondent cannot be expected to answer
it truthfully. The reason for mentioning it in this context is to keep in
mind the sort of information we would like to obtain if we could.
There are situations where this question has to be answered. DecisionsI
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haveto be made in circumstances where lives are at stake, and where
valuations of changes in mortality rates are implicit in public and private
decisions.
a. We place values on life-saving in our decisions to engage or not to
engage in medical expenditures. If the cost per patient of a kidney trans-
plant is $72,000, and if we decide that those who need kidney transplants
will get them, and if the expected life of a person with a kidney trans-
plant is 17 years, we are deciding that a 17-year extension of life is
worth at least $72,000.
b. Similarly, a valuation of life-saving is implicit in expenditures to
prevent road accidents. 2
c. A valuation of changes of mortality rates reflecting private as
opposed to public decisionmaking is implicit in rates of hazard pay. If a
carpenter who works at the top of a high building runs a 1 in 1,000 risk
per year of falling off, and if he accepts a premium of $100 for taking
that risk, he values his life at $100,000.
d. If the amount of armor on an airplane affects the chances of its
being shot down, a valuation of life is implicit in decisions as to how
much armor the plane should have.
Though the pricing of lifeis implicit in many public and private
decisions, it is difficult to find prices and to extricate valuation of life
from other considerations. I have only been able to find a few prices and
these are shown in Table 1. In interpreting these prices an in using
them to impute values of decreases in mortality rates, several considera-
tions should be kept in mind.
First, by value of life, I mean nothing more than aC0/OD0, the amount
one would pay per unit for a decrease in one's mortality rate in the cur-
rent year. The statement that the price of life is $20,000 in this sense
does not mean that a man would sacrifice his life for $20,000, any more
than the statement that the price of butter is $0.25 per pound means
that a man would pay $20,000 for the pleasure of consuming 40 tons of
butter.
Second, the valuation of life implicit in decisions affecting mortality
rates is different from the valuation society puts on saving the lives of
identifiable people. Thedie and Abrahamhaveexpressed this point as
follows: "If a miner is imprisoned at the bottom of a pit, if a mountaineer
is in danger up in the mountains, if a vessel is in danger of shipwreck on
15J•Thedie and C. Abraham, "Economic Aspect of Road Accidents," Traffic
Engineering and Control, 1961, p. 590.210 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
TABLE I
Scraps of Evidence on the Value of Life








dialysis in hospital 270
dialysis at home 99
3. Valuation of the cost of disease 75
4. Valuation of the cost of airplane accidents 472
5. Traffic safety
recommended for cost-benefit analysis by the National
Safety Council 37.5
valueof life in a cost-benefit study of highways 100
6. Military decision-making
instructions to pilots on when to crash-land airplanes 270
decision to produce a special ejector seat in ajet plane 4,500
SOURCE:LineI. Hazard pay: Three collective bargaining agreements in the mining
industry contain premiums for working underground of 14, 5. and 3 cents per hour.
These were respectively: Opemiska Copper Mines (Quebec) Ltd., and Le Syndicates
Travailleurs des Mines de Chibougamou-Chapais (1965), Lake Shore Mines Ltd. and
International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers Local 240 (1958),andHollinger
Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America Local 4305 (1961).
In the United States, the risk of a fatal accident is 0.49 per million man-hours in coal
mining and is 0.05 in all industries combined (AccidentFacts 1970, theNational Safety
Council. Chicago). Suppose that half of the premium for working underground is com-
pensation for the risk of a fatal accident and the other half is compensation for the risk
of nonfatal accidents and for inconvenience, and that, in the mines to which the agree-
ments refer, the risk of a fatal accident above ground is 0.05 per million hours and the
risk of an accident underground, in mining proper, is 0.49 per million hours, so that the
extra risk of working underground is 0.44. The value of life implicit in the three agree-
ments is therefore $159,000, $57,000 and $34,000, respectively. The questionable
aspects of this calculation need neither emphasis nor elaboration. Note however that in
principle hazard pay yields a true value of life in that, like all wage rates, it reflects
valuations at the margin. If the hazard pay were set too low, the miners would be dis-
inclined to work underground and if hazard pay were set too high they would be dis-
inclined to work above ground. A United States air force pilot whose basic salary was
$12,012 was paid a premium of $2,280 for engaging in especially dangerous test flights
that raised his chance of losing his life from 0.1348 to 1.695 per cent per year. The
(Notes continued on next page)J
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Notes to Table I (continued)
value of life implicit in that contract was $167,000 [$2,280 ÷ (.01695 — .001348)].
(J. W. Carlson, "Valuation of Life-Saving." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
1963.)
Line 2. Medical expenditure: These figures are based on data from H. E. Kiarman,
J. 0'S. Francis, and G. D. Rosenthal, "Cost Effectiveness Analysis Applied to the
Treatment of Chronic Renal Disease," Medical Care, 1968, pp. 48—54. Discounting
at 6 per cent, they find the present values of the costs of hospital dialysis, home
dialysis, and transplantation to be $104,000, $38,000 and $44,500, respectively, and
that the years gained in the three treatments are 9, 9, and 17. The figures in our table
are not the costs of the treatments but the implications of these numbers about the value
of the life of an average man of 30 years of age whose life expectancy is 45 years. The
value of life of a 30-year-old man that would make hospital dialysis, for instance, a
marginal life-saving expenditure is $104,000 x (18/7), where 18 and 7 are the approxi-
mate discounted life expectancies at 5 per cent of 45 and 9 years of life. The discounted
life expectancy of 17 years is II years. In principle, all of these medical estimates may
reflect intramarginal situations in that many people who have to pay their full share of
the extra taxes required to finance these treatments would willingly vote to have these
treatments made available for everyone even if the treatments were more expensive
than they are now. Nevertheless, one gets the impression from the literature that the
cost of hospital dialysis is, if anything, extramarginal in that the expenditure on hospital
dialysis is often said to be more than society "can afford."
Line 3. The source of this estimate is Dorothy P. Rice. Estimating the Cost of Illness,
Health Economics Series 6, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1966,
p. 93. The figure in Table Iis an average of the discounted earnings of a man and a
woman of age 25—29 when the discount rate is 6 per cent. For reasons discussed at the
outset of this paper. I believe that this type of calculation is inappropriate in principle
for determining the value of life.I include it together with the valuation of loss of life in
airplane accidents because endorsement of this calculation by the U.S. government puts
a certain weight on the estimate of the value of life independently of the validity of the
method by which the estimate was arrived at, and signifies that the estimate itself is
deemed reasonable.
Line 4. Gary Fromm measures the cost of a fatality in an air crash as the present value
of the lifetime earnings of the typical passenger ("Civil Aviation Expenditures," in
R. Dorfman, ed., Measuring Benefits of Government investments). Assuming the aver-
age age of a passenger to be 40 years, and setting the discount rate at 6 per cent, he
estimates the cost per fatality in 1960 to be $373,000.Iincrease this number to
$472,000 iii TableIto approximate the present value of the earnings of an airline
passenger whose income is typical of incomes of all airline passengers but who is only
30 years old. Fromm thinks of his calculation as representing a lower limit to the true
value of life. Leaving aside the question of the suitability of the present value of earn-
ings calculation for evaluating the cost of loss of life, the contrast between Fromm's
estimate of the value of life of an airline passenger who tends to be rich and Rice's
estimate of the value of life of an average American raises the interesting issue of
whether a public decision-maker ought to accept private valuations in cost-benefit
analysis where life-saving is one of the benefits or costs. This would seem to be a case in
which each dollar of benefit ought not to be counted as equal to every other dollar of
benefit "to whomsoever the benefits may accrue."
Line 5. Traffic safety: A figure of $37,500 was recommended as the value of life for
cost-benefit analysis of traffic safety by J. L. Recht, How to Do a Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Motor VehicleAccidents, NationalSafety Council, September 1966. This figure also
seems to have been arrived at by discounting somebody's lifetime earnings. The figure
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of $100,000 is presented, without justification or explanation other than thatitis
alleged to be customary, in a study conducted for the National Highway Safety Bureau
of the U.S. Department of Highways, No. FH-l 1-6495.
Line 6. Military decision-making: The pilot of a F-86L jet fighter plane occasionally
finds himself in a position where he might either eject himself from the plane, allowing
it to crash, or attempt a landing. Instructions to the pilot as to when to eject himself
from the airplane imply a value of life of at least $270,000, when consideration is given
to his probability of survival if he abandons the plane, to his probability of survival if he
tries to land the plane, to the cost of the plane, to the probability of losing it in the event
of an attempted landing, and to the damage that might be caused by a crashing plane. This
figure is not very instructive because the cost of training a pilot for a F-86L jet is
$300,000 (Carlson, op. cit.). Carlson also cited a case in which the Air Force spent $9
million designing and producing an ejector seat which would save between one and
three lives.
TableIis a collection of numbers which are not obviously intramarginal. In my
cursory examination of cost-benefit analysis in circumstances where the lengthening
of lives is one of the benefits, I encountered many examples of projects which had to be
intramarginal in the sense that no rational decision-maker could refuse to undertake
such projects when the possibility of doing so is recognized. For instance, G. Torrance
(A Genera/ized Cost-Effectiveness Mode! for the Evaluation of Health Programs.
Faculty of Business, McMaster University, Research Series No. 101) found that the
cost per newborn child saved in a program of preventing hemolytic disease was $932.00.
I would hope that this fact conveys no information about the value of life.
thehigh it would be criminal to reckon efforts and money accord-
ing to the number of human lives to be saved. It would be vain to in-
quire whether the sum spent on saving these few lives if invested else-
where (on roads for instance) might not have enabled more lives to be
saved. It is impossible to weigh in the balance certain deaths and prob-
able deaths, even if the latter are in greater number."
Thirdly, the price of life is different from the price of butter in that the
price of butter is the same to everyone who buys butter while the price
of reductions in mortality rates may vary from one man to the next
within the same market. Mortality rates are private commodities, by
which I mean that they are not and cannot be traded in the market be-
cause they are produced in the household from ordinary commodities.
Other private commodities are risk and capital as components of stocks
and bonds, the consumption activities in Lancaster's formulation of the
theory of demand,16 leisure, and the components of a hedonic price
index. Ordinary commodities like pounds of butter or hours of the serv-
ices of a carpenter cost the same to a rich man and a poor man alike.
The price of a private commodity like leisure is different to a rich man
than to a poor man, for each man values leisure as the marginal product
16K. Lancaster,"ANew Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political
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ofan hour of work, and the marginal product of a poor man is different
from the marginal product of a rich man insofar as productivity of
labor is the source of the difference in their incomes. If the price of
butter were lower to the poor man than to the rich man, the poor man
in a competitive economy would sell butter to the rich man and cause
prices to equalize. No comparable mechanism equalizes the price of
leisure. Leisure cannot be detached from its owner in the way that butter
can be detached from its owner, and arbitrage fails to equalize prices
in this market.
Precisely the same is true of the price of a reduction in mortality rates.
Suppose, as illustrated in Figure 2, that a man is confronted with a
number of ways of reducing his mortality rate, listed here in order of
cost; wearing a safety belt in his car, visiting his doctor for an annual
check-up, fire-proofing his house, having a special test for cancer, install-
ing a radio transmitter in his yacht, reinforcing his automobile, keeping
a co-pilot at all times in his private jet plane. These options constitute a
supply curve to the individual of reductions in his mortality rate, and
corresponding to this supply curve is a demand curve for reductions in
mortality rates which could be derived in the usual way as the locus of
all combinations of andD0consistentwith the utility function
of equation (1) when other parameters are held constant or varied in some
systematic way with D0.Theposition of the demand curve would depend
on the tastes of the individual and on his income, and the wealthier he
is, the more he would pay to reduce mortality rates and the higher would
be his demand curve. Each man's supply curve of reduction of mortality
rates is also unique as it depends on the circumstances of his life, in
particular, on the nature of his work. In Figure 3 the supply curves fac-
ing a rich man and a poor man are presumed to be identical. Their de-
mand curves differ, and the value of life of a rich man (in our special
sense of the term "value of life") is higher in equilibrium than the value
of life of a poor man.
Evidence on shadow prices of mortality rates is of limited use in con-
structing an imputation to economic growth, because mortality rates are
private commodities. Even in perfect markets, values of reductions in
mortality rates differ from one man to the next so that prices implicit
in given transactions are relevant only to people who actually engage
in those transactions and not to the population as a whole. Furthermore,
private commodities are typically indivisible; so their costs need not be
shadow prices at all. The value of a reduction of the mortality rate
implicit in the decision to have an annual medical check-up need not214 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
FIGURE 2
Supply Curve of Mortality Rate Reduction to a Rich Man
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reflect a man's valuation of his life if his demand curve cuts his supply
curve at a higher value.
The issue is complicated still further by the fact that reductions in
mortality rates have externalities. We are prepared to sacrifice to pro-
long our neighbor's life even though we are relatively unconcerned
about the size of our neighbor's income. Evidence of public and pri-
vate behavior in circumstances where decreases in mortality rates can
be bought conveys some useful information and gives hints of what
might be a reasonable valuation of life in cost-benefit analysis and in our
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imputation for increased life expectancy. This evidence does not point
to a unique price or to a unique range of prices depending on a man's
age and his mortality rates in each future year. Reductions in mortality
rates differ from ordinary commodities in tha.t unique prices do not exist.
Having said this, we shall suppose that there is a unique price aC0/3D0
corresponding to a set of mortality rates Danda level of permanent
consumption C, as there would be if society were one individual writ
large, and we shall use this information to impute a value for the in-
crease in life expectancy in the national accounts.
AN IMPUTATION TO THE CANADIAN ACCOUNTS
Both the value of life and the corresponding growth rate of income in-
clusive of an imputation for the increase in life expectancy are computed
in accordance with equations (21) and (22) with several values of the
parameters rand/3andwith Canadian data for the years 1926 to 1968.
The data required are time series of real net national product per head
to measure C(t)andage-specific mortality rates to measure D,(t).In
each year, the value of L for the population as a whole was taken to be
a weighted average value of L in that year for all ages, with weights
reflecting the age distribution of the population in 1961. The rate of
interest, r,wasgiven values of 1, 3, and 5 per cent, and /3,whichis the
more critical variable, was given all values between .05 and 1.0 in steps
of .05. The growth rate of real net national product per head over the
years 1926 to 1968 was 2.25 per cent. For all combinations of rand/3,
the computed values of life and growth rates of net national product
inclusive of the imputation for increased life expectancy are presented
in Table 2. The effect of the imputation for increased life expectancy
depends very much on the values chosen for the parameters /3 and r.For
r= 1per cent, the rate of economic growth inclusive of the imputation
for increased life expectancy varies from 2.48 per cent when /3 =1up
to 6.98 per cent when /3 =0.05.From among these growth rates, we
choose the one corresponding to a computed value of life that approxi-
mates values of life recorded in Table 1.
If one sets a value of life at, say, $150,000, the effect of the imputa-
tion for increased life expectancy is to raise the growth rate by about
one-half of 1 per cent a year, from 2.25 per cent without the imputation
to about 2.8 per cent. This result holds for all three interest rates; if
r= 1per cent, then, to the nearest 0.05, /3 =0.45and the growth rate
is 2.77 per cent; if r 3per cent, then /3 =0.30and the growth rate is
2.84 per cent; if r= 5per cent, then /3 =0.25and the growth rate is
2.80 per cent.Measure of Changes in Life Expectancy
TABLE 2
Growth Rates, 1926-68, and the Value of Life
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of Life, of Life, of Life,
1961 a Growth 1961 aGrowth 1961 aGrowth
(000 Rate of (000 Rate of (000 Rate of
/3 omitted)Incomebomitted)Incomebomitted)Incomeb
5% $1,331 6.98%$910 5.78% $671 5.00%
10 666 4.61 455 4.01 336 3.63
15 444 3.83 303 3.42 224 3.17
20 333 3.43 228 3.13 168 2.94
25 226 3.19 182 2.95 134 2.80
30 222 3.04 152 2.84 112 2.71
35 190 2.92 130 2.75 96 2.64
40 166 2.84 114 2.69 84 2.59
45 147 2.77 101 2.64 75 2.55
50 133 2.72 91 2.60 67 2.52
55 121 2.68 83 2.57 61 2.50
60 111 2.64 76 2.54 56 2.48
65 102 2.61 70 2.52 52 2.46
70 95 2.59 65 2.50 48 2.45
75 89 2.56 61 2.48 44 2.43
80 83 2.54 57 2.47 42 2.42
85 78 2.53 54 2.46 40 2.41
90 74 2.51 51 2.44 37 2.40
95 70 2.50 48 2.43 35 2.39
100 67 2.48 46 2.42 33 2.39
NOTE: Thegrowth rate of income without the imputation for increased life expectancy
is 2.25percent. Values of the variable C(t) from 1926 to 1968 are taken from the na-
tional accounts. The appropriate concept is net national product in 1961 dollars which is
not provided directly by the accounts but which may be estimated as [gross national ex-
penditure in constant (1961) dollars X(grossnational expenditure —capitalconsump-
tion allowance)] ÷ (gross national expenditure), all the terms of which are contained
in NationalIncome and Expenditure Accounts, 1926—1 968. DominionBureau of Sta-
tistiCs, August 1968.
Time series of age-specific mortality rates for the first year of life, for the next four
years. and for five-year intervals thereafter up to age 84, and with a final category of age
85 and above, were obtained from various issues of VitalSialistics.DominionBureau of
(Notes continued on next page)
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Statistics,pp. 84—10 1. Annualmortality rateswere constructedonthe assumptions that
the rate for any grouping of ages applies equally to all ages within that group and that
ninety years is the maximum length of life. These annual mortality rates do not cor-
respond exactly to the terms D, becauseis the probability of dying on the first day of
the year jonthe special assumption that all deaths occurring in any year are concen-
trated on the first day. Consequently the estimate of L differs slightly from that implied
by equations (16) and (19). In the calculations leading to Table 2, the discounted life
expectancy of a man who is now] years is measured as




wheretheare age-specific mortality rates obtained from vital statistics data. The term
in square brackets is the sum of the probability of a man of age] completing at least i—j
man years of life
andhalf the probability of his dying i—f years from now
[ii(1 — Dk)(15 12)].
Thefactor 2 is included in the expression above because a man who will die 1yearsfrom
now has an expectation of remaining alive for half of that year.
The term L(t) in equation (23) is estimated as
L(t)
÷Pi(l96l)]
where L,(t) is the value of L, in the year IandP,( 1961) is the Canadian population of agej
in the year 1961.
aDefinedas (11f3)C(1961)L(1961).
Inclusive of an imputation for increased life expectancy: growth rate of C(t)[L(t)I
L(l96 1)18.
The estimated increase of one-half of 1 per cent in the growth rate
attributable to the improvement in life expectancy is by no means in-
significant but seems to me to be rather low. The reason may be that I
have underemphasized the importance of the fall in mortality rates in
infants and children. The first hypothesis in the calculation is that each
man is concerned with his own mortality rate exclusively, and since the
great majority of people have passed infancy, the decline in the infant
mortality rates cannot have a great effect on the final estimate. The
decline in the infant mortality rate would have had a greater impact on
the imputation if the interest of parents and prospective parents had been
taken into account explicitly.
I have criticized the use of present value of earnings as a measure ofMeasure of Changes in Life Expectancy 219
thevalue of life, arguing that the present value of earnings does not re-
flect what a government responsive to the preferences of its citizens
would pay to reduce mortality rates. However, the alternative concept
of the value of life gives rise to measurements that have a good deal in
common with the present value of earnings measurements they are
intended to replace, for both are variants of expected discounted income.
An important empirical difference between the two measures is in the
age distribution of the value of life, illustrated in Charts 1 and 2. Chart
1 is based on our calculations and Chart 2 shows present values of earn-
ings as estimated by Riceina study under the auspices of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It turns out that both
calculations put a value of about $130,000 on the life of a 30-year-old
man, but the graph of the present value of earnings is an inverted U that
peaks sharply at about age 30, while the value of life attains its maximum
at about age 2, implying that society would spend more to preserve the life
of a child than it would spend to preserve the life of an adult. Disease oc-
curs chiefly in infancy and in old age when the present value of earnings
is quite low relative to our calculation of the value of life. Rice assessed
the cost per death from tuberculosis to be $31,000 and the cost per
death from diseases of infancy and early childhood to be only $25,000,
despite the fact that she valued the life of an adult at prime earning
capacity at over $100,000. An implication of the calculation in this paper
is that the value of the life of a child is on the order of $150,000: a
government representing people whose preferences are described by
equations (1') and (3') with r= 5per cent and /3 =0.25would be
prepared to spend up to $150,000 to save the life of a randomly selected
child in 1961. Another difference between the present value of earnings
calculation and the value of life calculation in this paper is that the
former values men more than women while the latter puts the same
value on the lives of men and women.
The final test of these two contrasting age distributions of the value of
life is whether they reflect preferences in the community at large. I have
no hesitation in saying that my preferences as to the comparative values
of children and adults, and of men and women, are more nearly repre-
sented by the calculation in this paper than by the present value of earn-
ings calculation. Unfortunately, the very plausible age distribution of the
value of life in Chart 1 emerges in part for the wrong reasons. The value
of a child's life is high not because concern of parents for children is
"Dorothy P. Rice, Estimatingthe Cost of illness,Health Economics Series 6,
U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1966.
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builtinto the utility function but because the expected discounted con-
sumption is higher for children than for adults. The year to year change
in discounted life expectancy, L, is shown in Chart 3.
As mentioned briefly at the outset of this paper, the addition of an
imputation to the accounts for the improvement in life expectancy in-
volves an element of double-counting if the rest of the accounts are left
unchanged because the maintenance or increase of life expectancy is part
of the benefit of medical and other expenditures already included in the
accounts. I have chosen to ignore this issue and to add, or rather multi-
ply, the improvement in life expectancy to the conventional measure of
income without additional adjustments. My. reasons for doing so are
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these: First, a substantial part of medical expenditure must surely be
attributable to the attainment of comfort rather than increased life
Second, medical expenditures are not the only ones that
increase life expectancy. If the expenditures that increase life expectancy
are scattered among the major categories in the accounts, and if these
expenditures grow at about the same rate as the rest of the accounts, it
makes no difference to the final estimate of the rate of growth whether
the mix of expenditures that increase life expectancy is included or not.
Third, in strict logic there is really no end to the list of expenditures that
may affect life expectancy. Food, clothing, and housing are all on the list
in the sense that without any of these our lives would be shortened con-
CHART 2
Present Value of Lifetime Earnings: Amount by Sex and Discount Rate
NOTE: The chart is based on data for the year 1963.
SOURCE: D.P.Rice, Estimatingthe Cost of Illness,U.S.





















I')siderably. But as a rule, the marginal dollar of expenditure in these cate-
gories has little to do with life expectancy and what connection there is
had best be overlooked.
Closely related to the problem of double-counting is the fact that most
of the change in mortality rates from one period of time to another ap-
pears to the individual as a free good. The imputation we have been dis-
cussing is to the expenditure side of the accounts exclusively—to the list
of goods and services we obtain from the economy in any year—and
there do not appear to be comparable items that may be attached to the
income side of the accounts to restore the balance.
IMPUTATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES
I have no direct intuition about the value of life in countries outside of
North America, and no information with which to determine reasonable
222 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
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valuesof randf3. What can be done is to suppose that their tastes are
the same as ours. In that case combinations of rand/3 which are plausi-
ble for Canada are plausible for other countries as well. Calculations on
these lines are set out in Table 3. The numbers in the table are derived
in exactly the same way as the Canadian numbers were derived, and the
table should be self-explanatory. The reader who is uncomfortable with
the assumption that shapes of indifference curves and values of /3 and r
arethe same elsewhere as in Canada may interpret the statistics in
Table 3 as indicating the growth of income of Ceylon, for instance, as it
would be assessed by a Canadian in the circumstances of the Ceylonese
economy.
The interesting feature of Table 3 is the magnitude of some of the
imputations for some of the underdeveloped countries. The growth rate
of Ceylon is more than doubled, and the growth rate of Chile is almost
doubled. If one may generalize from these scanty bits of information, it
seems that in the period since World War lithe underdeveloped coun-
tries, alleged by Pearson and many other authors to have prospered less
on average than the rich countries, have in fact done no such thing. It
was in this period that many poor countries enjoyed an improvement in
life expectancy greater than that enjoyed by rich countries in this or any
other period of time, an improvement that more than compensates for
the difference between rich and poor countries in growth rates of GNP
as conventionally measured.
COMMENTS
Though the coverage of the national accounts may be satisfactory for
the purpose of designing and evaluating short-run economic policy, it is
generally believed to be too narrow for the purpose of monitoring the
progress of the economy as a whole. In the last few years there has
developed an interest in social indicators, which are time series of sig-
nificant aspects of life—justice, health, progress in the arts—outside the
normal coverage of the national accounts. (Expenditures on these items
are included in the national accounts, but it is input to these items rather
than outputs that is reflected in measures of real income.)
An imporant constraint on the use of social indicators is that there
does not seem to be a natural and appealing way of aggregating them
into a single measure of the progress of the economy. Of course, weights
can always be chosen, but there is normally no basis for preferring one
set of weights to another, no way of finding weights that reflect common




pectancyr = 1%, r = 3%, r5%,
Country Period Increase /3 =.45 /3 =.30 /3 =.25
Ceylon 1946—63 1.65% 3.81% 4.22% 4.14%
Chile 1931—65 1.57 2.77 2.94 2.89
France 191 1—64 1.82 2.47 2.56 2.53
Japan 1930—60 3.I3 4.49 4.67 4.58
Taiwan l952—66 4.15 5.09 5.25 5.22
SOURCE: Theprincipal sources of data were various issues of the U.N. Yearbookof
National Accounts Statistics andthe U.N. DemographicYearbook. Thesesources were
supplemented by (a) for France, AnnuaireStazisrique de Ia France. 1966;C. Kindel-
berger, EtonomicGrowth in France and Britain. /851—1950, andLong-TermEconomic
Growth, 1860—1965. U.S.Department of Commerce, 1966: (b) for Japan, Japan
Statistical Yearbook, 1964; (c)for Taiwan, NationalAccounts of the Less-Developed
Countries, /950—1966. Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development, and
ChinaYearbook, /966—1967, ChinaPublishing Company, Taiwan; (d) for Ceylon,
StatisticalAbstract of Ceylon, variousissues; (e) for Chile, M. Mamalakis and C. W.
Reynolds, Essayson the Chilean Economy, Irwin,1965, statistical appendix, p. 384.
Gross national product was used instead of net national product to represent C(t)
becausethe information needed to estimate the latter is frequently unavailable. Quite a
bit of crude estimating was required to derive annual mortality rates from the available
data. As with the Canadian data, mortality rates in five-year intervals had to be
attributed to each year separately, but in addition some even larger time intervals had to
be dealt with, and sometimes the time intervals differed from one year to the next. The
higher age-groups were particularly troublesome. Two methods were used to derive
mortality rates in five-year intervals from data on mortality rates in ten- or fifteen-year
intervals. If data were available for five-year intervals in another year, I would normally
assume proportionality between mortality rates in the five-year intervals in the two
years. Otherwise mortality rates in intervals longer than five years would be attributed to
each year in the interval. The maximum age was assumed to be 90. Sometimes when the
final open-ended time interval, intervals such as "mortality rates for people over 70
years of age," began well short of age 85, mortality rates in five-year intervals were
estimated by postulating that they rose in a systematic manner consistent with available
data on population and mortality rates in the larger time intervals. For each country,
data on income and mortality rates were collected for the first year, the last year, and
selected years in between.
aInclusiveof an imputation for increased life expectancy.
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TABLE 3
Imputations for Increased Life Expectancy in Other Countries
Ar
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thecoverage of the different series is mutually exclusive. Confronted with
a set of social indicators, one finds oneself in a position such as one
would be in if faced with innumerable time series of ordinary quantities
—chicken soup, can openers, light bulbs, ties, spark plugs, telephones—
without prices and with no way of aggregating the series into a single
index. The emergence of social indicators gives rise to a search for a
way of combining them with each other and with the economic informa-
tion in the national accounts.
• The task of this paper has been to find a natural way of combining
• two social indicators, the GNP and mortality rates, into a single, com-
prehensive index. Weights were constructed from information about the
value of life, from assumptions about the form of utility functions, and
on the strength of a somewhat unfamiliar concept of real income. The
resulting system of weights for comparing the conventional measure of
income and mortality rates on the same scale, while not wholly arbitrary,
is less well-grounded in observed behavior in the market than the price
weights used to combine quantities in the national income; there is every
reason to believe that people differ in their assessments of the relative
importance of growth of national income and the decline in mortality
rates, for arbitrage does not equalize values of life among people in
the way it equalizes prices of butter. In the final analysis, the weighting
of the growth of conventional income and decline of mortality rates for
cost-benefit analysis or in a unified measure of economic growth is a
political problem.
Despite this intrinsic lack of precision, the imputation for the decline
in mortality rates is worth making because of its magnitude. A large
part of the answer to the question "How are we doing?" depends on
whether life expectancy is increasing or not. An imputation of an extra
half per cent to the rate of economic growth in Canada is too large to be
ignored. To exclude the imputation for increased life expectancy in
measuring the rate of economic growth of certain poor countries is to
overlook half of the economic growth and to misrepresent economic his-
tory on a very large scale.
The imputation of a value to the accounts for the increase in life
expectancy casts a wider net among the social indicators than may be
evident at first glance. The worst effects of pollution are eventually
manifest in mortality rates. Admittedly there are aspects of pollution,
such as noise and congestion, that probably do not affecf mortality rates
significantly. But the major concern with pollution is with its lethal
aspects, and these are accounted for in the imputation. Any attempt to226 TheHousehold and Business Sectors
impute a negative value to the national accounts for the ill effects of
pollution will have to be done in the context of the complete matrix of
causes of changes in mortality rates. One might well want to show that poi-
lution causes income, in some sense of the term, to be less than it might
otherwise be, but one would not want to show a reduction of income as
a consequence of the lethal aspects of pollution unless one also shows
that the potential decline is overbalanced by the over-all rise in life
expectancy. The general rule is that one ought not to impute for a part
of any category, such as life expectancy or leisure, if the trend of growth
of the part is opposite to the trend of growth of the category as a whole.
The aspect of the analysis in this paper that I find least satisfactory is
the mechanical and arbitrary nature of the separability assumption (3')
used in deriving the utility assumption. The main point made in the
introduction is that value of life is essentially a matter of taste. The
inclusion in the utility function of the parameter p,whichmay be set in
accordance with real or imagined evidence about behavior, gives con-
siderably more scope for taste than is incorporated into the present value
of earnings calculation. The relation between a person's age and the
value of his life seems reasonable in that high values are placed on the
lives of children. Unfortunately, this very plausible result emerges from
the wrong reason. It ought to reflect externalities in the utility function,
particularly the concern of parents for children. Instead it is based on
the fiction that children, who have longer to live than adults, place higher
values on their lives. Though the implications of our utility function are
plausible, we really have no assurance that anybody's tastes are actually
reflected in it.
COMMENT
ROBERT J. WILLIS, City University of New York and National Bureau
of Economic Research
Perhaps no single factor has so altered the prospects of the individual
as the historically unprecedented decline of mortality which began in
the mid-nineteenth century in the West and inthis century in the
less developed countries. In northern Europe, the expectation of life
at birth, which averaged about 40 years in 1850, rose to about 70
years by 1950. Even more dramatic is the estimate that one-fourth of
a cohort of births in the 1840's would be dead by age 2.5 while in
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62.5.As Stolnitz [3, p. 28] put it,"the number that could expect
to survive the childhood years a century ago was substantially smaller
than the number reaching old age today." The decline of mortality,
facilitated by the transfer of Western medical and public health tech-
nology, has been even more rapid in the less developed countries al-
though, of course, their mortality rates remain well above those in
the advanced countries.
Common sense would suggest that such changes in longevity should
be a major source of increased individual welfare; yet the national in-
come accounts which provide the main statistical basis for judging
changes in welfare omit altogether any direct consideration of changes
in mortality rates. At the very least, Dan Usher in his attempt to remedy
this difficulty has provided us with an imaginative, tightly argued and
intriguing way of looking at the problem of imputing value to changes
in longevity and has, as well, illustrated a number of ways in which
it should not be done. If this method is accepted, the paper also takes
on major substantive importance because of the magnitude of the ad-
justment to conventionally computed growth rates when imputations
for the value of changes in age-specific mortality rates are made. For
instance, he finds that under certain assumptions the growth rate of Ca-
nadian per capita income from 1926 to 1968 was increased by one-half
of 1 per cent—from 2.25 to 2.8 per cent—by the imputation while
the growth rates of some less developed countries which have recently
experienced very rapid declines in mortality were doubled, becoming
higher than growth rates in more developed countries rather than lower,
as the conventional measure would have it. I believe that Usher's work
points in the right direction and that this direction is important to
explore further, but, for theoretical reasons I shall elaborate shortly,
I think his imputations overstate the contribution of increases in life
expectancy to the growth in welfare.
The need for a new approach to the economic valuation of human
life has been amply illustrated, sometimes in grisly fashion, from ex-
amples drawn from existing approaches in a recent paper by Mishan
[2] and by Usher in this paper. For example, using per capita income
or consumption as a standard, most neoclassical growth models imply
that a decrease in mortality rates would generally imply a reduction
in economic welfare. In these models, the impact of declining mor-
tality on national economies is usually considered, following the Mal-
thusian tradition, to be exerted mainly through its impact on the rate
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the labor force and, sometimes, the savings rate. It is almost always con-
cluded that in steady state growth, the level of per capita income or
consumption at any moment in time will be inversely related to the
rate of population growth. Furthermore, in some models excessive rates
of population growth induced by income growth (or transfer of medical
technology) may prevent an economy from escaping a "low level
equilibrium trap" to reach a higher level of living in which popula-
tion growth is smaller. These implications are frequently invoked to
support policies to reduce birth rates but, in logic, they may equally
well be used to support policies to raise death rates.
The question being answered by such models, which Usher terms the
"birth control question," is: "How much better or worse off would the
community at large be if I ceased to exist or if I had never been born?"
The thrust of this question is that, because of the law of variable pro-
portions, a marginal increase in the labor force caused by population
growth will reduce the average income of others. This will cause a
decrease in welfare if we concentrate on the welfare of the "others"
and ignore the welfare of the one who ceased to exist or of persons in-
terested in his existence. Apparently this is more easily done when
contemplating a potential birth than a potential death for reasons not
apparent from logic of the argument itself (see [2, p. 690] for a similar
point).
In any event, Usher argues that the "birth control question"is
not the true "valuation-of-life question" which he says is: "How much
would I pay to avoid a small probability of my death?" As an ex-
ample, he states that a man who will pay $500 to avoid a 1 in 1,000
chance of death may be said to place a $500,000 value on his life. It
should be emphasized that this is not the "insurance question" criticized
by Mishan [2, p. 691] in which the answer to the question "What is my
life worth to my wife and children?" will determine the premium the
man would be willing to pay for life insurance against a 1in 1,000
chance of his death. The $500 expenditure given in answer to the
"valuation of life question" represents $500 of real resources because
the man expects to avoid the 1 in 1,000 chance of death by his expend-
iture while a "mathematically fair" life insurance premium merely cov-
ers the risk entailed in passive acceptance of the chance of death and
uses no real resources. There would be no imputation problem if all
changes in mortality were the result of expenditures by individuals to
change their own rates, assuming each such expenditure to be the maxi-
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viously,this is not the case; so imputation is necessary even at the risk
of a fair amount of double-counting entailed by a failure to adjust con-
ventionally measured income for expenditures designed to reduce mor-
tality. At the end of the section "An Imputation to the Canadian
Accounts," Usher gives several plausible reasons for doubting the seri-
ousness of double-counting problems, especially when the emphasis is on
measuring the growth rather than the level of income.
Usher approaches the evaluation of life question formally by assum-
ing that an individual's utility for the rest of his life, U, can be expressed
as a function of the lifetime utility, U5, that he would receive from his
current and future consumption stream if he should live exactly j years
and the probability, P,, that he lives exactly j years for all possible
values of jfromzero to n, the maximum length of the remaining pro-
portion of the individual's life. In order to make this approach oper-
ational, Usher specializes this general utility function by making two
assumptions. The first, which he calls the "expected utility hypothe-
sis," is that the utility function takes the form,
(1')
and the second, which he calls the "separability assumption" is that
g—1
(3') i0(l+r)
whereis the individual's lifetime utility should he live exactly tyears,
$ is the elasticity of annual utility with respect to consumption, and r is
a discount factor which Usher argues is "different from and as a rule
less than the real rate of interest on riskiess assets." Given these assump-
tions and recognizing that the Pg are functions of the age-specific mortality
rates, it is possible to find the increase in current consumption Co necessary




This marginal rate of substitution is considered by Usher to be the value
of life, and given the schedules of future consumption and age-specific
mortality rates, it will be determined by the parameters r and $.
Usherargues that national income accounts should be based upon
statistics reflecting current conditions rather than forecasts of the future.
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Accordingly, he assumes that=C,=C(t),where C(t) is the current
level of NNP and that current age-specific mortality rates will continue




where the S, are survival rates and L(t) is the "discounted expectation of
life." Equation (19), in turn, implies that
e(t)= C(t)L(t)/L(1961)(l/i3), (20)
where is"the value of net national product at which one would be
as well off with mortality rates of the base year as one was in yearwith
actual net national product, C(t), and actual mortality rates, D,{t), of
that year." The difference between the growth of andC(z) represents
the imputation to national income for improvements in mortality.
The most remarkable implication of Usher's approach as embodied in
(19) and (20) is that the growth rates of discounted life expectancy L(z)
and of conventionally measured income C(t) cumulate rather than average
out so that
+ (GL/13), (21)
whereis assumed to be less than or equal to one. As Usher points out,
"It is a consequence of the assumptions we have made about the form of
the utility function and the concept of income that the effect of the impu.
tation for increased life expectancy is necessarily to increase the rate of
growth, and the increase is normally greater than the rate of growth of
life expectancy itself."Since it is this implication that mainly accounts
for the large empirical magnitude of the imputation, it is important to
examine just what concept of income Usher is employing and how it
compares to the conventional concept before we know how to react to
his estimates.
I believe that it can be demonstrated that Usher's concept of income
is, in one sense, the polar opposite of the conventional concept and that
the meaning of the conventional concept can be greatly clarified by the
use of Usher's formulation.If, to take an extreme case, an individual
lived forever, we could express his "lifetime" utility in Usher's terms by
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Ifp is set equal to1, the right hand side of (18'—19') is equal to
the present value of a perpetual continuation of consumption at its
current level C(t). In conventional terms, of course, this is equal to
society's wealth defined as the present value of the stream of output that
could be produced if the society's current stock of resources remained
intact forever. Included in the stock of resources is the population from
which the labor force is drawn.
It is a fact of sometimes deep significance that a population com-
posed of mortal men may itself be immortal. In order to carry out
his computations, Usher assumes "that there is a unique price 3C0/aP0
corresponding to a set of mortality ratesand a level of permanent
consumption C, as there would be if society were one individual writ
large." It is now apparent that the conventional view of permanent
consumption as the return from a fixed stock of resources is as it would
be if the individual were immortal society writ small. In this sense,
Usher's concept of income and the conventional concept are polar op-
posites.
It now becomes clear that Usher's rejection of Hicks's definition of
income,
Y(t) =C(t)+ W(t + 1) =W(t), (15)
was based on an erroneous supposition that a decrease in mortality
rates would cause wealth to increase (see the section "Growth of
What?"). If the individual is society writ small, he is immortal by
definition and changes in actual mortality rates are immaterial.
It would appear that our reaction to Usher's imputations must de-
pend on our philosophical position as to whether national income
should measure the permanent output obtainable from a fixed social
stock of resources or the level of a surrogate for the lifetime utility of
an average individual in the population. If I were forced to make such a
choice, I would find much to recommend Usher's position as against
the conventional position. It seems to me, however, that the choice need
not be so severe. Usher began his theoretical model with the injunc-
tion, "Ignore the fact that men live in families and that families are
imbedded in communities of people who are concerned with each other's
well-being." In the sense of welfare, thisis an injunction to ignore
sources of longevity other than one's own physical existence, especially
the expectation of the existence and well-being of one's children and
other heirs. In a sense, the conventional view of income implies that
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heir's consumption; his "rate of benevolence," to use Boulding's term
[1], is equal to unity. Surely, the truth is that the rate of benevolence
is somewhere between zero and one. Thus, Usher's imputation—on this
score, at least—probably gives us an upper bound on the value of
increased life expectancy.
Following the line I have been arguing, itis parents who reveal
their preference for decreasing the risk of death faced by their off-
spring and to whom a change in welfare should be imputed when infant
and child mortality rates change. Since parents have the power to cre-
ate a new life to replace one lost while an adult cannot replace his own
life, the value of a decrease in infant or child mortality using this ap-
proach would probably differ substantially from that found using Usher's
approach. The magnitude of the imputation for changes in life expect-
ancy is likely, empirically, to be quite sensitive to changes in the treat-
ment of the mortality rates faced by the young because it is these rates
that have changed the most, especially in the less developed countries.
In this paper, Usher has raised a set of issues of which many econ-
omists, including myself, were only dimly aware and he has succeeded
in demonstrating that the resolution of these issues is of vast import-
ance for our understanding of past economic growth and our evaluation
of policy alternatives before us. Now that we are aware of them, I am
confident that the issues raised here will be pursued much further, both
empirically and conceptually.
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